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of Genetic Resources in Patent Applications? – 






In the lead-up to two meetings in June 2005 which will address the question of 
whether there should be an obligation of disclosure of origin of genetic resources in 
patent applications, this paper uses the on-going international policy debate in this 
area as a platform both to make some specific observations about this particular 
issue, and to offer some comments on the broader question which it raises of how the 
intellectual property world integrates with other legal and ethical regimes.  
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In the lead-up to two meetings in June 2005 which will address the question of 
whether there should be an obligation of disclosure of origin of genetic resources in 
patent applications,
1
 I want to use the on-going international policy debate in this area 
as a platform both to make some specific observations about this particular issue, and 
to offer some comments on the broader question which it raises of how the intellectual 
property world integrates with other legal and ethical regimes. Let is start with this 
‘Big Picture’ perspective. 
2. The Evolving Relations of the IP world 
I recently shared a platform at an international conference
2
 with Dr Francis Gurry, 
Deputy Director General of WIPO, who offered the view that WIPO has “…no 
methodology whatsoever…” to tackle the interface between patent policy and public 
policy. He helpfully categorised the evolution of the patent system into three stages: 
• Stage I  (1886 – TRIPs): unimodular system; patent law’s own policies drove 
the system 
• Stage II  (1992-1998): System begins to consider its impact on other policy 
areas 
• Stage III (1998-present): More complexity and interaction; IP considered 
from other policy areas 
The implication is that, underlying this evolution of interaction is an historical 
tendancy for the patent system to be extremely insular. Moreover, despite far more 
interaction today than has ever occurred in the past, it is still possible to detect strong 
enduring reluctance to see, or accept, the patent system as part of a greater whole.  
There is considerable evidence of this in the current debate on disclosure of origin of 
genetic resources in patent applications. While we have, at least, reached the stage of 
accepting – and agreeing
3
 - the need to examine the dynamics between the patent 
system and the CBD regime, our policy options are very much constrained by an 
unwillingness in certain quarters to accept a reality: which is - the interconnectedness 
of the patent regime, not only to CBD, but, potentially, to many other legal and ethical 
frameworks. 
But even among those who are more open to this reality, thinking in the area can often 
be task-oriented and driven, leaving us to speculate about the more wide-ranging 
implications of adopting any given set of policy options. 
                                                 
1
 WIPO, Ad hoc Intergovernmental Meeting on Genetic Resources and Disclosure 
Requirements, 3 June 2005, and the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Eighth Session, 6-10 June 
2005.  
2
 University of Cambridge, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Japanese National 
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Bioethical Issues of Intellectual Property in 
Biotechnology, Tokyo, Japan, 6-7 September 2004. 
3
 See, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the CBD 
Secretariat and WIPO (Document WO/CC/48/2, 24 July 2002).  
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Thus, for example, the current flurry of activity on disclosure of origin stems from the 
invitation from the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) to WIPO
4
 to examine the issue in more depth, and most notably to 
do so in terms of the CBD objectives in Article 1; especially that of “…the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources …”.  The resulting debate has 
therefore largely be framed – and delimited – by these boundaries.  
By the same token, a survey of the member states’ responses to the invitation – and 
the resulting WIPO first Draft Examination of Issues Relating to the Interrelation of 
Access to Genetic Resources and Disclosure Requirements in Intellectual Property 
Rights Applications (Jan 2005)
5
 – reveals a far greater range of expectations from the 
notion of introducing an obligation of disclosure of origin. 
While the WIPO Draft Examination does a good job of collating and laying out the 
range of options that have been raised, it does a far less satisfactory job of equipping 
us to approach the policy debate in terms of the fundamentals in issue: that is,  
• What, in essence, is at stake? And, 
• What can we realistically expect of the patent system?  
3. What is expected? 
Among others, the following expectations of a disclosure of origin obligation have 
been mooted: 
• To fulfil properly existing disclosure requirements in patent law, viz, novelty 
and inventive step 
• To acknowledge a link between the genetic resource and the invention 
• To acknowledge a link between the genetic resource and the inventor 
• As a means to monitor and sanction compliance with access and benefit 
sharing agreements, i.e. the CBD focus 
• As a possible means to further the other objectives of CBD, namely, 
conservation and sustainable use 
• As a means to verify and/or ensure compliance with other national laws, e.g. 
on prior informed consent (which may include an element of ethical review) 
                                                 
4
 The ‘invitation’ was in fact, first, to produce a Technical Survey on methods within the patent 
system for requiring disclosure relevant to genetic resources and traditional knowledge (COP 
Decision VI/24C, paragraph 4), and then more recently, "…to examine, and where 
appropriate address, taking into account the need to ensure that this work is supportive of and 
does not run counter to the objectives of the CBD, issues regarding the interrelation of access 
to genetic resources and disclosure requirements in intellectual property rights applications.” 
(COP Decision VII/19E, paragraph 8). 
5
 WIPO Secretariat, Examination of Issues Relating to the Interrelation of Access to Genetic 
Resources and Disclosure Requirements in Intellectual Property Rights Applications: First 
Draft (2005), available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/proposals/first_draft_examination_cbd_invitation.doc.  
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• There has even been discussion of measuring the ‘rightfulness’ of conduct to 
obtain/use genetic resources (even in the absence of any national legal 
prohibition) - which brings in a far more ethically-based perspective.
6
 
4. Why such expectations? 
But we have to ask why there is such a range of expectations? The answer depends on 
what is expected. Some of these expectations are about the moral significance of the 
material or the people it has come from; others are about transparency of process; 
others are about assisting in furthering other objectives (such as those of the CBD), 
and others still are about a quasi-regulatory function to complement other regulation 
regimes. 
We need to know – WHY – because a whole host of answers to other questions 
depend on this. For example, key questions that are raised in the Draft Examination 
include: 
• What is the subject matter that is the focus on the obligation? 
Well, it depends. Are we concerned about biological material because it is ‘living’, or 
are we concerned about the ‘value’ of the resource (in either monetary or moral 
terms)? 
• When does the obligation of disclosure arise? 
Well, it depends. Are we concerned to know the source of the genetic resource to 
determine its relationship to an invention, or is its source of significance in measuring 
ethical compliance in its acquisition and use? If the former, the obligation only arises 
when there is a sufficiently strong connection between resource and the invention per 
se. If the latter, arguably, the obligation may be triggered if the resource has been used 
at any point in the development of the invention.
7
 
• Which consequences should flow from non-compliance? 
The Draft Examination certainly acknowledges that ‘…consequences of failure to 
comply may, in principle, flow from reasons for the imposition of the requirement’. 
[emphasis added] But it only does so in passing. Yet, to my mind, this is the 
fundamental issue – there is no ‘may’ about. The principles at stake necessarily 
inform the practice. And I would suggest that we are far from clear about which 
principles are at stake. 
5. How should we approach the debate? 
So how do we approach the debate and begin to answer these questions? Underlying 
many of the expectations – although not necessarily all – are notions of justice. It is at 
this point that the intellectual property lawyers leave in disgust: surely this notion is 
simply too abstract and indistinct to be helpful. But we have to remember that equity 
underpins the obligation of benefit sharing under CBD, and, closer to home for the IP 
                                                 
6
 See A.K. Gupta, WIPO-UNEP Study on the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Use of Biological Resources and Associated Traditional 
Knowledge, pp.57-58, available at:  http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/publications/769e_unep_tk.pdf.  
7 Another obvious question is, which actions are to be monitored? 
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lawyer, it is obvious that the relationship between ‘justice’ and ‘disclosure’ is, in fact, 
well know in the patent regime. It arises, of course, from the very nature of the regime 
itself, which is built on obligations of disclosure that are justified in large part because 
of ideas about when it is fair or just to grant or to deny a patent.  
On a justice analysis, the substantive criteria for patentability require disclosure of all 
of the elements of invention necessary to allow an expert to reproduce it because it 
would be unfair to give a monopoly in the absence of a genuine and significant 
contribution to human knowledge; similarly, we test novelty through enabling 
disclosure because it is unacceptable to award a monopoly for something already 
invented.  
We do not normally articulate the substantive criteria of patent law in this way – 
indeed, we (intellectual property lawyers) tend to talk of these as ‘technical matters’ – 
but notions of justice are there nonetheless. 
This is not to suggest that this is a definitive analysis of substantive patent criteria, but 
it is to suggest that this is a meaningful interpretation of how we see existing 
disclosure obligations from within patent law. Moreover, we universally accept that 
non-compliance carries the severest of consequences, namely, refusal/revocation of a 
patent.  
We are far less certain, and certainly far less agreed, about the impact of justice 
concerns from outside the patent system. But I would also suggest that this is largely 




The WIPO Technical Study suggested that the underlying key issue is how to 
characterise the necessary relationship between genetic resources/TK and an 
invention.
9
 But responses from member states indicate a far greater range of concerns 
and expectations of a disclosure of origin obligation. 
Fundamentally, then, we must be clear about what we want to achieve, and a focus on 
justice may be one means to ensure that the debate at least begins on a level playing 
field.
10
 Moreover, if justice is at stake, it may assist in determining how this should be 
addressed. 
                                                 
8
 The WIPO Draft Examination document acknowledges: ‘One way of characterizing the 
relationship [between genetic resources and  disclosure requirements] may be to draw a link 
between inequitable behavior in one context or jurisdiction, and entitlement to exercise patent 
rights in another, where the patented invention is in some way a consequence of the 
inequitable behavior. Another way of defining the link would be to view the denial or 
invalidation of a patent right in one jurisdiction as a form of sanction for non-compliance with 
other laws. Some uncertainty surrounds this kind of mechanism in international policy debate, 
and further study may be necessary of approaches to enforcing non-patent legal 
requirements through the patent system., see note 5 above, para 74.   
9
 Ibid, para 76. 
10
 I favour this idea because it straddles fields (in the sense that it is a commonly understood 
and valued concept), it lies at the very hear of CBD, and because it is a common denominator 
in many of the concerns raised (even if it is not articulated as such). It is acknowledged, 
however, that it will not help to address all concerns. But then, maybe we should not expect 
too much of the obligation of disclosure of origin.  
(2005) 2:2 SCRIPT-ed 
 
270 
6. How should we handle a disclosure of origin obligation? 
This brings us back to the issue of the interface of patent law with the wider world.  
Gurry’s analysis of the policy history of the patent system as three distinct approaches 
is reflected, I believe, in the responses of WIPO member states to the Invitation by the 
COP of the Convention on Biological Diversity on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Disclosure Requirements in IP Rights Applications.  
I would categorise these as follows: 
6.1 Separatists 
First, we have the separatist group – which includes the United States and Australia – 
and which persists in a view of the patent regime as a world apart. For them, solutions 
must emerge outside patent law. This is a position which conveniently allows a 
principled stance to be taken in respect of ideas such as benefit sharing because – on 
this view – it then becomes someone else’s problem. My own view, for what it is 
worth, is that this is an outmoded, unrealistic, and increasingly unsustainable view of 
patent law. This is not to say, however, that some arguments advanced by this group 
are not valid, and we shall return to this below.  
6.2 Revisionists 
The second group are the revisionists – that is, those willing to revise the patent 
system in light of its impact on other policy areas. This approach is fine as far as it 
goes, but often it does not go far enough. For example, the proposals on the disclosure 
obligation which simply seek internal reform of the patent system perpetuate a view 
of disclosure as instrumental to existing intellectual property ends.
11
 We have seen, 
however, a range of views on other ends that might be furthered by such an 
obligation, and these cannot be adequately addressed within established patent 
paradigms (if they are to be addressed at all).  
By the same token, patent law can only give responses from within the limits of its 
own boundaries, being – a system concerned essentially with an economic right to 
monopoly of a market for a fixed period of time. And, as Australia has pointed out, 
refusal to grant a patent does not necessarily prevent commercialisation, although it 
may seriously hinder securing benefits for further distribution.  
Yet, the ‘power’ of the patent system – in the sense of its unique contribution – 
essentially lies in the ability to grant or deny monopoly control. The EU position, 
however, rejects this as a policy solution. Its proposal seems, at first sight, revisionist 
in its acceptance of the need to include disclosure requirements in patent applications. 
Ultimately, however, it maintains a separatist stance by arguing that sanctions for 
non-compliance should arise outside the patent system. It seems to me that this robs 
their proposal of virtually all of its potential impact.     
                                                 
11
 These measures include: a) requirements to disclose known TK when relevant prior art, b) 
requirements to disclose when TK holder may be ‘inventor’, c) requirement to disclose 
source/origin when access to material is required to enable invention, or d) under Budapest 
obligations. All and more of these are discussed fully in the Draft Examination and Technical 
Study documents.  




We are left, then, with what I would call the integrationalists, who seek a far more 
holistic approach to the role and function of patent law. Most developing countries 
seem to adopt this approach, and I would join them. The stark reality we have to face 
up to, however, in seeking a more integrated approach between patent law and other 
legal and ethical systems, is the limitations of the patent system itself in terms of what 
it can realistically achieve. Beyond this, it is also important for this group to articulate 
what is expected of further integration between systems.  
The proposal from Brazil is typical of this approach and contains ambitious 
expectations of the disclosure requirement ranging from (1) an argument that it will 
improve patent examination standards, (2) through ensuring accurate attribution of 
inventorship, (3) and on ultimately to the view that “…it would constitute an 
important realization of the principle of equity”.
12
 Indeed, what unifies most of the 
reasons offered by Brazil is equity. What may divide them, however, is efficacy. The 
United States, for its part, argues that certain key objectives simply cannot be realised 
by including a disclosure of origin provision in patent law, viz, (1) access and 
equitable benefit sharing, (2) preventing misappropriation of genetic resources, and 
(3) preventing erroneously issued patents. If this is true, it rather puts an end to the 
matter. But we do not know if it is true, and there are now many examples of models 
in practice
13




None the less, in terms of beginning to discern how to integrate better the patent 
system with other systems this points to an important factor, viz:. 
• EFFICACY: when we articulate what we expect of further integration between 
systems, efficacy must be a crucial factor in identifying the nature of the 
relationship between patent law and other systems.  
• ADDITIONALITY: To this I would add the criterion of additionality – by 
which I mean, we should ask: what, if anything, can a solution based in patent 
law bring to existing systems that does not already exist in those systems?
15
 It 
seems to me that the main answer to this is the ‘power’ of the patent system 
mentioned above, namely, to grant or deny monopoly control.
16
 For example, 
does the prospect of denying/revoking a patent provide an additional safeguard 
to interests surrounding genetic resources, albeit if it is only, or largely, in the 
                                                 
12
 See, Brazil’s Position on the Principles and Methodology of Work that should be Employed 
in the Preparation of the Response by WIPO, 16 December 2004, p.3, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/proposals/brazil.pdf.  
13
 For a recent comprehensive report and suggested model, see M Dross and F Wolff, New 
Elements of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing of Genetic Resources: 
The Role of Certificates of Origin (2005), available at: http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/233/2005-
001-en.pdf.  
14
 See also the work of the UNU-IAS study acknowledging that we still do not know enough 
about the effectiveness of many approaches to date: 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/research/certificatesoforigin.cfm.  
15
 This may alternatively be termed the need to avoid redundancy. 
16
 There is also, of course, the possibility of transfer of rights upon a finding of illegitimate non-
disclosure.  
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form of the disincentive that the threat represents? I think that the position is 
definitely arguable, and it is for this reason that I find the EU proposal to be 
distinctly unhelpful in moving the debate forward.
17
 The corollary, of course – 
if the incentive/disincentive analysis of intellectual property is accurate - 
is the risk of detriment that might arise if a regime deters on-going work 
using genetic resources. 
• USURPATION: The patent system is not the regulation system nor vice versa, 
and we therefore must be careful to avoid illegitimate attempts to transplant 
functions of one system into another. There may, however, be much scope for 
congruence between the systems.  
• CONGRUENCE: the grant of a patent in the face of illegitimate acquisition of 
genetic resources may be seen as a form of state-sanctioned unjust enrichment, 
and on this analysis the issue is one of avoiding incongruity between 
regulatory and patent regimes. Congruence would suggest that each system 
should reflect and re-enforce the value preferences underpinning them in a 
manner that is true to the essential nature of those preferences.  
This brings us back, then, finally, to the fundamental questions that I consider to be so 
important: what are our values in this debate, and is the patent system the best way to 
give expression to them?  
I have suggested that justice is an important value in this context, not just for what it 
represents for its normative appeal, but also for what it can mean for policy 
development. If fundamentals such as justice are at stake this requires a far stronger 
response than may be justifiable in respect of other values. 
                                                 
17
 The official line taken by the EU for rejecting this option was on grounds of fear of creating 
legal uncertainty.
